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1. ‘Dignity of the human person’ and ‘human dignity’ are phrases that have come to be 
used as expressions of basic value accepted in a broad sense by all people. For 
centuries human dignity was a theoretical notion only, deliberated in the field of 
philosophy, ethics and theology. After the tragedy of World War II, as an aftermath of 
mass human rights violations and genocide, this concept has gained its normative 
character, becoming a legal category for international law. As it is declared in the 
Preamble to the United Nation’s Charter, ‘human dignity’ has been proclaimed the 
central concern of international law: “…faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person (…).”Also, the first sentence of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights appeals to “the inherent dignity and (…) the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family.” The term dignity is included as well in its 
1st Article, in which it is stated that: “All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. 
Although expressions of dignity appear in numerous international treaties, 
resolutions and declarations (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Helsinki Accords), there is no explicit definition of the term. The idea of 
human dignity is both familiar and abstract. It is assumed that its meaning can be 
intuitively comprehended. It can be invoked in concrete situations, since anyone can 
recognize acts of violation of human dignity even if he/she is not able to define this 
abstract notion.1 But what is meant by ‘respect’ for ‘intrinsic worth’ or ‘inherent 
dignity’ of a person? The general answer can be found in the Kantian injunction to treat 
every human being as an end in itself, not as a means only. Respect for inherent dignity 
implies that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as instruments or 
objects of the will of others. Respect for the intrinsic worth of a person requires 
recognition that the person is entitled to his or her own beliefs, attitudes, ideas and 
feelings. 
2. According to Louis Henkin, the very idea of human rights is grounded in the 
political philosophy and ethics that inspired the framers of the American Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights. Americans were prominent among the architects and builders of 
the international human rights system, and American constitutionalism was the 
principal inspiration and model for it. As a result, most of the provisions of the first 
international human rights documents (charters, declarations and treaties) are in their 
essence American constitutional rights projected around the world.2 If the international 
human rights proclamations are simply a contemporary implementation of America’s 
own founding vision, one should examine American constitutional law in the matter of 
provisions for human rights, especially the Eighth Amendment, as it invokes the 
concept of human dignity the most. 
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The presence of the phrase ‘human dignity’ in the jurisprudence of the U.S. 
Supreme Court is not very firm. It is mostly limited to a background of extra-
constitutional principles. Its sense is present most of the times in the glosses that some 
justices add to their dissenting opinions, and then, most notably, in cases involving The 
‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ of the Eight Amendment. The main reason for 
its absence in constitutional litigation is that it is not explicitly contained in the text of 
the American Constitution, Bill of Rights or subsequent amendments. Because of this 
fact, its constitutional status is less obvious than that of liberty or equality. But it does 
not mean that it is not protected by Constitutional law – since the phrase ‘human 
dignity’ is present in many U.S. Supreme Court’s verdicts, either directly or in the 
context of values associated with it (e.g. freedom of speech and religion, equal 
protection of the law). In general, one set of the Court’s decisions explains how various 
constitutional provisions are designed to compel governmental respect for human 
dignity by prohibiting certain actions. The constitutional limitation on cruel and 
unusual punishment; compelled self-incrimination; search and seizure; double 
jeopardy; arbitrary judicial procedures and censorship have been found to be rooted in 
human dignity, to which justices have referred specifically to, while justifying their 
decision. Moreover, a fair number of the most consequential holdings, especially equal 
protection holdings, accord with respect for human dignity. The most vivid example of 
the position of the Court with respect to human dignity, however, without using the 
phrase ‘human dignity’, is Brown v. Board of Education, in which human dignity is 
indirectly affirmed.3 
Commentary on the Supreme Court’s use of the concept did not appear until the 
second half of the 20th century. The reason for the absence of earlier references to 
human dignity is that the notion of it has become widely acknowledged only since after 
the World War II. Since then, in the United States the process of re-reading the 
American Constitution in the light of the ‘intrinsic worth’ of a human being has taken 
place. There are some constitutional theoreticians who interpret the U.S. Constitution 
in the context of human dignity, arguing that the Constitution compels governmental 
respect for human dignity, and appreciating the legitimacy of references to the values 
that are not expressed in the very text of the Constitution.4 This approach confirms that 
the text is the ultimate source of authority but also acknowledges that it is more than a 
simple set of words – since along with the words, there is a spirit, tradition, and certain 
values included in it. This is the notion of ‘living Constitution’ according to which 
judges must look beyond the wording alone if they are to execute their judgments 
faithfully. The judicial interpretation should seek to effectuate, as Justice Warren stated 
in Trop v. Dulles, “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”. The main representatives of such views, W. Murphy, J. Paust and 
G.P. Fletcher, claim “that the wording and purpose of the Constitution point 
unmistakably to the protection of human dignity as its chief aim. Citing the natural law 
orientation of the founders, they find the particular political institution consecrated in 
the Constitution, as well as human rights guarantees, to be directed towards 
effectuating a vision of government that cherishes human dignity. Accordingly, they 
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would have the text interpreted consistently with pursuit of that overarching 
objective.”5  
3. Historically, ‘human dignity’ appeared for the first time in 1946, in the opinion of 
Justice Murphy dissenting in In re Yamashita (327 U.S. 1, 1946).6 The use of ‘human 
dignity’ appeared when Justice Murphy, against the backdrop of war crime 
prosecutions, counseled that: “if we are ever to develop an orderly international 
community based upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance 
that the necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from 
the ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.” Whether Justice Murphy’s brethren 
shared his view is impossible to know because the case was decided on a narrower 
issue than this presented by Justice Murphy.  
Since then, subsequent the U.S. Supreme Court opinions have been perceived as 
signs of progress towards a satisfactory understanding of human dignity’s role in 
constitutional interpretation. Some of the Supreme Court’s noticeable declarations and 
affirmations of the importance of human dignity for understanding constitutional rights 
appear in ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ cases.  
Among the earliest and most significant is Trop v. Dulles, 1958, the case of a 
private named Trop who served in the U.S. Army in French Morocco in 1944. On May 
22, Trop escaped from a stockade at Casablanca. The next day he returned to the 
stockade. In 1952 he applied for a passport. His application was denied on the grounds 
that under the provisions of Section 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, he had lost 
his citizenship by reason of his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime 
desertion. In 1955 a petitioner commenced this action in the District Court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that he was a citizen. The government's motion for summary 
judgment was granted, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
legality of a denial. In 1958 the Supreme Court reversed the military court’s decision to 
strip Trop of his U.S. citizenship. The majority, for whom Chief Justice Earl Warren 
spoke, found such “denationalization” a cruel and unusual punishment “forbidden by 
the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment”. Warren 
then set out an often cited description of these provisions: “The exact scope of the 
constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court (…) The 
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this 
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonments and 
even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any 
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect 
(…) The Court has recognized (…) that the words of the Amendments are not precise, 
and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”7 
Eventually the final decision of the Supreme Court was made on the grounds that the 
punishment of expatriation denies a fundamental human need for participation in 
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society, and is a “punishment more primitive than torture”, and thus, as incompatible 
with human dignity, it is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
4. Another case in which the Supreme Court expressly recognized that reference to 
human dignity is indispensable for the proper interpretation of the Constitution is 
Furman v. Georgia (1972). The case was concerned with the requirement for a degree 
of consistency in the application of the death penalty. The victim in the case had 
returned to his house, while Furman was breaking into it. While trying to escape, 
Furman tripped and his gun fired accidentally. One of the residents of the house was 
shot and killed. Furman was tried for murder and was found guilty. He was sentenced 
to death. By a 5-4 vote the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty statutes of 
Georgia and, by extension, those in every state. Death penalty laws, the majority stated, 
left too much discretion to juries in imposing this ultimate penalty. The result was a 
“wanton and freakish” pattern of its use that violated the Eighth Amendment ban on 
cruel and unusual punishments. Since the case was an extremely controversial one, 
each of the justices wrote a separate opinion. Out of all of them the most significant 
from the perspective of human dignity, is Brennan’s. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, made a conclusion based upon the Trop v. 
Dulles case, that the Eighth Amendment limits capital punishment because execution is 
incompatible with human dignity. This incompatibility can be seen in two ways. First, 
capital punishment had been applied – when one looks at its historical use8 – to treat 
“members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and 
discarded”, thereby meaning without any respect for their fundamental intrinsic worth. 
Second, the infliction of capital punishment is random and arbitrary, imposed upon 
some but not all who have committed the same crimes, and thereby it disregards the 
basic equality of individuals, definitely interrelated to human dignity. He found the 
death penalty uniquely degrading to human dignity, claiming that “death is an 
unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it is 
inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is 
no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less 
severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of these principles is to enable a 
court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. Death, quite 
simply, does not.”  
However, more noteworthy than attitudes toward capital punishment are the 
deliberations on the concept of human dignity and on the ‘Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause’ in Furman v. Georgia. Thus, the ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause’, like other constitutional clauses, does not lend itself to precise definition. 
Therefore, there was a great need for creating, as stated in Weems v. United States 
(1910), “legal principles to be applied by the courts”, when a legislatively prescribed 
punishment was challenged as cruel and unusual. And in Furman v. Georgia Justice 
Brennan formulates some principles, based on the concept of human dignity. He refers 
to previous Court verdicts, especially to Trop v. Dullas, when reminding everyone that: 
“the basic concept underplaying the Clause is nothing less then the dignity of man.” 
But he takes a step further, affirming that human dignity is the central idea embodied in 
the Eighth Amendment, the foundation of it, when uttering: “the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. 
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The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic 
worth as human beings. A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual’, therefore, if it does not 
comport with human dignity.” Subsequently Justice Brennan recognized the principles 
inherent in the Clause and sufficient to permit a judicial determination as to whether a 
certain punishment may be inflicted, as comporting with human dignity. Scrutinizing 
challenged punishments with Brennan’s Test, judges are able to assess which 
punishment, out of those legislatively prescribed, may be imposed without risking 
violation of the ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.’  
There are four principles using which the court may determine whether a particular 
punishment is ‘cruel and unusual’. All are rooted in previous Supreme Court verdicts 
on the subject. The primary one is that a punishment “must not be so severe as to be 
degrading to the dignity of human beings.” There must be a few factors verifying the 
penalty during the judgment. Physical or mental pain, extreme severity, barbaric 
punishments, and enormity are among these. On these grounds, as Justice Brennan 
noted in Furman v. Georgia, the Court adjudged the punishment in Weems v. United 
States (12 years in chains with hard and painful labor for falsifying a public and official 
document), in Trop v. Dulles (expatriation for desertion), and in Robinson v. California 
(imprisonment for narcotics addiction). The true significance of these factors, 
according to Brennan, is that these punishments – when relating to barbaric one – “treat 
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. 
They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the clause that even the 
vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity”; when 
relating to addictions is stated “to inflict punishment for having a disease is to treat the 
individual as a diseased thing rather than a sick human being” and when relating to 
enormity they “may reflect the attitude that the person punished is not entitled to 
recognition as a fellow human being.”9 
The second principle inherent in the ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ is that 
the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. As Justice Brennan 
maintained: “this principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect 
human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment 
that it does not inflict upon others.”10 
A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a punishment must not be 
unacceptable to contemporary society. “Rejection by society, of course, is a strong 
indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human dignity.”11 However, 
the question here is: are there any objective indicators on the basis of which the Court 
can deem if a particular punishment is socially unacceptable? Brennan found the 
answer to this in the Supreme Court ruling of, among others, Weems v. United States, 
Trop v. Dulles, Robinson v. California. And the objective indicator may be: (1) 
existence of the punishment in jurisdiction other than those before the Court; (2) 
historic usage of the punishment; (3) combined present acceptance with past usage; or, 
finally, (4) common agreement that a particular punishment is no longer approved by 
society (“in the light of the contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a 
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criminal offense of such a disease would doubtlessly be universally thought to be an 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment”). 
The final principle in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. 
A punishment is excessive when it is unnecessary. As Brennan said: “The infliction of 
a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is 
nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less 
severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is 
inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” And it 
therefore violates human dignity. 
Among these principles, Justice Brennan prioritizes the first one, as essential for the 
application of the following ones, and for the Clause in general – the punishment must 
not be in its severity degrading to human dignity. Within these principles, he 
formulates a specific ‘legal tool’ that can and should be used by courts when 
determining whether a certain punishment comports with human dignity. Since they 
are all interrelated, the punishment should be justified under every principle – the test 
is a ‘cumulative one’. “If the punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong 
probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary 
society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more 
effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that 
punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman 
and uncivilized punishment upon those convicted of crimes.” 
5. As a result of the Supreme Court position in Furman v. Georgia, and especially of 
Justice Brennan’s ruling, human dignity has gained a material (normative) status in the 
process of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, becoming the legal category of 
constitutional evaluation of the State’s actions in the field of individual rights and 
freedoms. Dignity, for many, is still an abstract concept without a real constitutive 
significance, that cannot serve as a sole value in judgments, including those dealing 
with ‘cruel and unusual punishments’. However, this opinion no longer predominates.  
